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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There is growing interest in whether or not United States 
First Amendment doctrine can, and should, accommodate certain 
regulatory strategies for safeguarding the public from potentially 
harmful online hate speech, or cyberhate.1 This article proposes 
significant reforms of American free speech doctrine in relation to 
cyberhate regulations by repurposing the captive audience 
doctrine. According to this doctrine, it may be permissible, even 
under the First Amendment, for governmental authorities to 
 
*Reader in Political and Legal Theory, University of East Anglia (UEA), UK. 
This Article is based on the paper I presented at a workshop on global 
expressive rights organized by Susan Brison and Katharine Gelber at 
Dartmouth College in spring 2015. I am very grateful for comments and 
insights from all those who attended. 
 1. See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYPBERSPACE (2014); 
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Hate Speech in Cyberspace, 49 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 319 (2014); Julian Baumrin, Internet Hate Speech and the First 
Amendment, Revisited, 37 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 223 (2011). 
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pass laws that abridge freedom of expression for the sake of 
protecting the interests of unwilling recipients of unwelcome 
speech. More specifically, this article examines the issue of 
whether or not the captive audience doctrine could be plausibly 
applied to circumstances in which persons are compelled by the 
facts of life in the Information Age to access messages and 
content through the Internet and the web and, subsequently, 
become unwilling recipients of unwelcome cyberhate. Although 
my arguments about online captive audiences may well have 
implications for other sorts of unwelcome speech, I do not intend 
to discuss those other types here. The primary goal is to show 
how the doctrine could be used to strengthen arguments for the 
constitutional permissibility of online hate speech regulations 
and to act as a bulwark against other aspects of free speech 
doctrine that discount such regulations, not least being the 
principles of content and viewpoint neutrality. 
I take it as read that there are two necessary conditions for 
applying the captive audience doctrine. First, the speech in 
question is unwelcome; second, the audience is unwilling. As I 
shall show in Part II, hitherto, courts have tended to unpack the 
notion of unwanted speech in terms of interests in privacy, 
autonomy, tranquility, and so forth, and have given substance to 
the concept of unwilling audiences by appealing to the 
unreasonable burdens of avoiding the home, the workplace, 
public transit vehicles, and so forth. In both respects, courts have 
ably developed the doctrine without recourse to examples of 
online hate speech. The existing case law on the captive audience 
doctrine does not include any cyberhate cases. Furthermore, in 
no existing hate speech cases do courts consider the captive 
audience doctrine. In other words, as it stands, the captive 
audience doctrine is not dependent on cases of captive audiences 
to online hate speech. I do not believe that there is any need to 
create this dependency. However, I do wish to argue that cases of 
captive audiences to online hate speech should not be excluded 
from the possible scope of the captive audience doctrine and that 
there are at least some analogical reasons why they should be 
included. This, in turn, could lend weight to the justification for 
cyberhate regulations. 
In particular, I shall argue that the notion of unwanted 
2017] Averting Your Eyes in the Information Age 
3 
speech is best understood as speech which harms some or other 
significant interest—an interest of sufficient importance as to be 
worthy of attention by courts. One key aim of my article is to try 
to reveal the nature of the significant interests involved in cases 
of hate speech on the Internet and the web. I shall do this by 
drawing an analogy with significant interests associated with the 
home. Moreover, I shall argue that the concept of an unwilling 
audience is best understood in terms of persons being unable to 
take practical steps to avoid the speech in question whilst, at the 
same time, not incurring harm to (yet further) significant 
interests. A second key aim of my article is to investigate the 
practicalities and burdens of avoiding hate speech on the 
Internet and the web. This includes not only a critical 
examination of various privacy controls, including filtering, 
blocking, unfollowing, and reviewing, but also an account of when 
it might be unfair to expect people to avoid online hate speech 
because, in the circumstances, doing so would involve 
unreasonable burdens. These burdens are to be measured, once 
again, in terms of harm to significant interests, only this time 
associated with abstinence from the Internet and the web. 
The idea that the captive audience doctrine could be a 
powerful weapon in the arsenal of defenders of hate speech 
regulations is already implicit in the work of other writers on 
that topic.2 Indeed, some have toyed with the idea of restricting 
what may even count as hate speech, so that it must be speech 
that is addressed to captive audiences as a necessary condition.3 
Much has been said about the appropriateness of extending the 
captive audience doctrine to hate speech when the latter amounts 
to discriminatory intimidation of people in their homes or on 
residential streets, for example. Thus, it has been suggested that 
cross burning can involve a violation of the privacy rights of 
captive audiences.4 Likewise, it has been argued that Nazi 
 
 2. See, e.g., Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Four Observations About 
Hate Speech, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 353, 362 (2009). 
 3. David Brink, Millian Principles, Freedom of Expression, and Hate 
Speech, 7 LEGAL THEORY 119, 135 (2001). 
 4. STEVEN HEYMAN, FREE SPEECH AND HUMAN DIGNITY, 165–66 (2008); 
Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in 
America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1211–12 (1994). 
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marches may not be an attack in Jewish homes, but they are an 
attack at their homes and a violation of privacy rights.5 In a 
similar vein, it has been claimed that to print cartoons depicting 
a handdrawn pig wearing a Muslim headdress with the name 
“Muhammad” sketched across its torso, and to post them on the 
external walls of the homes of Palestinians “living under the 
regime of belligerent occupation,” is to harm a captive audience.6 
In relation to the workplace, it has been argued that employees 
who are subjected to gender-based and other forms of hate 
speech, which creates a hostile working environment, ought to be 
considered a captive audience.7 Similar arguments have also 
been applied to students in classrooms on university campuses.8 
Others extend the doctrine to hate speech occurring in other 
parts of the university campus, most notably halls of residency or 
 
 5. See, e.g., Rosalie Berger Levinson, Targeted Hate Speech and the First 
Amendment: How the Supreme Court Should Have Decided Snyder, 46 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 45, 67 (2013). 
 6. Amnon Reichman, The Passionate Expression of Hate: Constitutional 
Protections, Emotional Harm and Comparative Law, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 76, 
120 (2007). 
 7. See, e.g., Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. LAW 1, 35–37, 45–46 (1990); Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive 
Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 85, 89–103 (1991) [hereinafter 
Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine]; J. M. Balkin, Some Realism 
About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 375, 423–4 (1990) [hereinafter Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism]; J. 
M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 
2312 (1999) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments]; 
Richard H. Fallon Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First 
Amendment Dog That Didn’t Bark, 1 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 43, 54 (1994); Delgado and 
Stefancic, supra note 2, at 362. 
 8. See, e.g., Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by Educational 
Institutions: A Proposed Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 345, 376 (1991); 
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled 
Listening, 89 BOS. UNIV. L. REV. 939, 962–63 (2009); Melissa Weberman, 
University Hate Speech Policies and the Captive Audience Doctrine, 36 OHIO N. 
UNIV. L. REV. 553, 583–89 (2010). Note, however, that it has also been suggested 
that the captive audience doctrine only applies to classroom hate speech when 
uttered by a professor or teacher. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
AND ITS LIMITS 186 (1999). This more nuanced view could draw support from 
Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986), and Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 
F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001). In these cases, the courts held that the captive 
audience doctrine did apply to the abusive, in-class speech of university 
professors and teachers. 
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dormitories,9 walkways, thoroughfares and corridors that 
students use to move between dormitories and classes,10 and 
even university sporting arenas.11 (Of course, there is no 
suggestion that every space on campus is apt to create captive 
audiences.12) By contrast, however, very little has been said 
about captive audiences for hate speech on the Internet and the 
web. 
Online hate speech, or cyberhate, is extremely varied, of 
course, almost as varied as the spaces and networks which 
constitute the Internet and the web themselves. Not surprisingly, 
some writers on hate speech have already started to examine in 
detail the special nature of, and the particular regulatory 
dilemmas and challenges posed by, online as compared to offline 
hate speech.13 But, once again, the specific issue of online captive 
 
 9. See Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim’s Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320, 2372–73 (1989); Charles Lawrence III, If 
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 
431, 456 (1990); Battaglia, supra note 8, at 376; Calvin R. Massey, Hate Speech, 
Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 
UCLA L. REV. 103, 177 (1992); TIMOTHY C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON 
TRIAL, 110–11(2d ed., 2009); Corbin, supra note 8, at 963; Weberman, supra 
note 8, at 576–79. 
 10. See Lawrence, supra note 9, at 457; Weberman, supra note 8, at 579–
83;SHIELL, supra note 9, at 110–11, 155. 
 11. See SHIELL, supra note 9, at 110–11. Cf. Gregory Matthews Jacobs, 
Curbing Their Enthusiasm: A Proposal to Regulate Offensive Speech at Public 
University Basketball Games, 55 CATH. UNIV. L. REV. 547, 551, 564–81 (2006). 
 12. Consider a case in which a student organization invites a university 
professor to present his controversial views on the innate differences between 
“the white” and “the black” races in the form of an extracurricular lecture, 
which students are free to attend or not attend and which takes place in a room 
on campus that the student organization has paid to hire out. It might be 
argued that the audience members are not captive ‘because they can simply 
choose not to attend the lecture.’ Charles H. Jones, Regulating Campus Hate 
Speech: Is It Constitutional?, 1992 NCCD FOCUS 1, 4 (1992). 
 13. See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech 
on the Internet, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817 (2001); Barbara Perry and Patrik 
Olsson, Cyberhate: The Globalization of Hate, 18 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 185 
(2009); Baumrin, supra note 1; CITRON, supra note 1; Delgado and Stefancic, 
supra note 1; RAPHAEL COHEN-ALMAGOR, CONFRONTING THE INTERNET’S DARK 
SIDE: MORAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ON THE FREE HIGHWAY (2015); 
Alexander Brown, What is So Special About Online (as Compared to Offline) 
Hate Speech?, ETHNICITIES (May 19, 2017),  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1468796817709846. 
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audiences is noticeably absent from that body of literature. 
For the purposes of framing my own discussion of online hate 
speech and captive audiences, I shall concentrate on six idealized 
examples. Although they are not intended to be exhaustive, they 
are meant to represent a cross-section of the sorts of styles and 
modes of hate speech that can be found on the Internet and the 
web. I believe they each involve the use of hate speech, either 
directly or indirectly, because they each exemplify one or more 
typical forms of hate speech (e.g., slur, derogation, negative 
stereotype, incitement to hatred, discriminatory harassment)14 
relating to members of groups or classes of persons identified by 
protected characteristics (e.g., race, ethnicity, nationality, 
citizenship, origin of birth, war record, religion, sexual 
orientation, gender or transgender identity, disability, age or 
physical appearance).15 This is true even if some of the examples 
might also enact other types of speech acts, such as invasion of 
privacy, false light, libel, online stalking, and so forth. 
It has also been suggested in the literature that people can 
constitute a captive audience only if speech is targeted at them, 
in the sense of being directly addressed to them specifically.16 I 
shall not assume that position here, however. Some of my 
idealized examples involve targeted online hate speech, whereas 
some involve speech that sits in wait for any audience members 
who happen to find themselves in the wrong part of cyberspace at 
the wrong time.17 I must also make it clear at this stage that 
 
 14. For an analysis of the concept hate speech, see Alexander Brown, What 
is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate, 36 L. & PHIL. 419 (2017); Alexander 
Brown, What is Hate Speech? Part 2: Family Resemblances, 36 L. & PHIL. 561 
(2017). 
 15. For a discussion of the numerous characteristics that governments 
could potentially deem “protected” for the purposes of hate speech law, see 
Alexander Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 1: 
Consistency, Practical, and Formal Approaches, 29 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 275 
(2016); Alexander Brown, The “Who?” Question in the Hate Speech Debate: Part 
2: Functional and Democratic Approaches, 30 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 23 (2017). 
 16. Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Work Place, supra note 7, at 36–37, 43; 
Battaglia, supra note 8, 364. 
 17. To clarify, on my proposed reading of how online hate speech makes for 
captive audiences, the crucial factor is not whether the hate speaker targets the 
audience, but whether the hate speaker wrongfully intervenes in the audience’s 
option-networks, meaning that the hate speaker closes down certain conjunctive 
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whilst I am interested in captive audiences for online hate 
speech, I am not solely interested in cases where the audience 
and the subjects of speech are one and the same. People can be 
captive audiences for online hate speech even if it is not about 
them. This may occur in cases of incitement to hatred, for 
example. Nevertheless, all of the examples are designed to test 
my hypothesis that at least some online hate speech can either 
create or exploit captive audiences. 
Case 1: Tagging. A student posts on his Facebook personal 
page a photograph that he has taken of a group of Muslim 
students entering the dedicated prayer space on campus. 
Accompanying the picture is this comment: “You can’t trust 
Muslims to live as peaceful members of any civilized community. 
You think they’re meeting to pray? Think again. They’re plotting 
attacks against us.” A Facebook friend of both the student who 
has posted the picture and one of the Muslim students captured 
in the picture, tags the picture using the name of the Muslim 
student. Because of the tag, the picture and comment appear on 
the timeline of the Muslim student’s Facebook profile pages. All 
of his Facebook friends can see the picture and the comment 
until he notices them and removes the tag. 
Case 2: Hate Sites. Mr. Kawolski, who also happens to 
have arthrogryposis (a congenital joint condition that causes 
curving of his arm joints), has a disagreement with his neighbors 
over their desire to build a wall along a shared property 
boundary in order to keep out bears who often stray into gardens. 
Over time a website that was created by the local residents to 
share ideas and plans relating to the wall starts to also include 
hate speech against Mr. Kawolski, including substitutions of the 
name “Mr. Kawolski” with “the cripple” and “the freak,” videos in 
which Mr. Kawolski’s disability is mimicked, defamatory 
allegations that Mr. Kawolski is only pretending to be disabled in 
order to claim disability benefits from the U.S. Social Security 
Administration, and assertions that Mr. Kawolski’s curved arm 
is punishment from God for his being a rapist in a previous life. 
 
options consisting of not receiving the online hate speech and not incurring 
unreasonable burdens by taking practical steps to avoid receiving the online 
hate speech, irrespective of whether or not the speech was directly addressed to, 
or directed at, him or her in particular. 
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Mr. Kawolski needs to stay abreast of what the neighbors are 
planning and discussing vis-à-vis the building of the wall, but 
accessing the website now means exposure to the disablist hate 
speech. Similarly, local officials and other interested third parties 
who also need to keep on top of the local residents’ plans, 
including individuals who might also be disabled, must run the 
gauntlet of disablist hate speech on the website in order to access 
the information they need. 
Case 3: Trolling. The friends of a deceased interracial 
couple set up a website dedicated to remembrance and 
memorialization. A self-confessed black nationalist gains access 
to the tribute site and defaces it with slogans denouncing 
interracial marriage and glorifying the death of the African- 
American man in question. The black nationalist proclaims that 
the man deserved to die for “selling out” his black brothers and 
sisters. Friends and family wishing to participate in the online 
memorializing, including individuals who might also be in 
interracial relationships, will be exposed to the trolling when 
they access the website. 
Case 4: Online Vandalism. Someone edits the Wikipedia 
page entry for Eureka, California, adding the following text to an 
existing section. “Child abuse scandal: In recent years two 
Catholic priests in our city have been exposed as child molesters. 
The Catholic Church did nothing to protect the children involved 
and did its best to cover up the scandal. The Catholic community 
in this city knew what was going on and kept quiet. So good 
people of Eureka, please, I’m begging you, don’t be scared to trust 
your feelings about just how much you can’t stand the Catholics 
in this city. Speak it out at the mall and at the ball game, tell 
them what you think of their hypocrisy, tell them that you won’t 
stand by any more and let them rape our youngsters. Stop hiding 
what you feel. These Catholics deserve only our hatred. Boycott 
St. Bernard’s High School if you have to.” It is two days before 
another user reverses the edits. 
Case 5: Copycat Parodies. A fan of a transgender model 
posts on YouTube a video of the model performing on a catwalk 
in New York, and adds a positive comment about how good she 
looks. Soon after, another video appears on YouTube with an 
almost identical title showing someone imitating the transgender 
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model only with exaggerated male features including a deep 
voice, a beard, and barely disguised male genitalia. A link to the 
parody video is posted in the comments section under the original 
video. The transgender model comes across both the original 
video and the parody video in the course of researching her public 
profile and with a view to learning what ordinary people think 
about transgenderism. 
Case 6: Cyberharassment. Court authorities have posted 
online the judgments from a series of rape cases in an effort to 
better educate members of the public about the nature of consent. 
The female judge who presided over the cases received special 
training to do so and is well regarded by her colleagues. However, 
not long after the judgments are posted online, the judge becomes 
the subject of a high volume of misogynist and threatening 
comments and messages. These are posted onto the comments 
sections linked to searchable databases of legal judgments, web 
forums, online newspaper articles, and blogs, and are posted on 
Twitter. These are online resources and Internet messaging 
services that judges typically use in the course of doing 
independent research, keeping up-to-date with public attitudes 
and mores, and communicating with colleagues. A typical 
comment runs as follows. “You stupid bitch. You cunt whore. I 
know where you live.” 
Do any of these examples involve captive audiences? Some 
people would be disposed to answer in the negative because of 
aspects of received wisdom about the nature of the Internet and 
the web, and of the speech made or received therein. These 
aspects of received wisdom include (1) that “the Internet is not as 
intrusive as television or radio”18 partly because “unlike the 
television, radio, or telephone message service, the Internet is not 
an uninvited guest,”19 which is to say that “[c]ommunications 
over the Internet do not appear on computer screens without the 
 
 18. Rachel Weintraub-Reiter, Hate Speech over the Internet: A Traditional 
Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber Constitution?, 8 BOS. PUB. INT’L L.J. 145, 
165 (1998). 
 19. Dawn L. Johnson, It’s 1996: Do You Know Where Your Cyberkids Are? 
Captive Audiences and Content Regulations on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 51, 94 (1996). 
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user taking a series of affirmative steps”20 and that “a user 
seeking information must affirmatively seek out harmful content 
by accessing an on-line chat room discussion or bulletin board 
service”21; (2) that “in most cases, it is possible to avoid 
undesirable messages [sent via the Internet]”22 in virtue of the 
fact that “computer-based communication services provide the 
user with alternative methods with which to evade offensive 
content”23; and (3) that an online audience can never truly be 
held captive because “the audience can always terminate the 
speech encounter with a simple keystroke, click of the mouse, or 
voice command, just as she can refuse an unwanted pamphlet or 
avert her eyes from offensive speech.”24 I intend to challenge 
these aspects of received wisdom more fully in Part IV. But for 
now let me simply cast doubt on the notion that the Internet and 
the web are not as intrusive or invasive as television or radio. 
I believe this can be done on several grounds.25 First, for 
companies and organizations wanting to change people’s minds 
or influence their consumption habits, the Internet and the web 
are now widely considered as being no less powerful than 
television or radio.26 Second, the massive volume of messages and 
content sent through or available on the Internet and the web, 
the vast number of interconnected users, and the bewildering 
array of methods of access, means that the Internet and the web 
have become ubiquitous.27 (In a normal working day, employees 
 
 20. Weintraub-Reiter, supra note 18, at 165. 
 21. Johnson, supra note 19, at 94. 
 22. Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? 
Comparison of Regulations in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. & POL’Y 253, 258 (2003). 
 23. Johnson, supra note 19, at 94. 
 24. Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public 
Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 233–34 
(1998). 
 25. Cf. J. M. Balkin, Media Filters, The V-Chip, and the Foundations of 
Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1136–38 (1996). 
 26. One indication is increasing spending on digital advertising. For 
example, industry researchers are predicting that United States advertisers’ 
spending on digital advertising will outstrip spending on television advertising 
in 2016. See Tim Peterson, Digital to Overtake TV Ad Spending in Two Years, 
Says Forrester, ADVERTISING AGE (Nov. 4, 2014), https://perma.cc/JL4F-VMCE. 
 27. Timothy Zick, Clouds, Cameras, and Computers: The First Amendment 
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are deluged with emails, messages, and notifications through the 
Internet and the web.28 Most homes contain multiple 
technologies that enable access to the Internet and the web. And 
today most people can be perpetually online, even when they 
leave the home, due to the development of affordable mobile 
devices and the widespread availability of mobile phone networks 
and Wi-Fi hotspots in both public and private settings.) Third, 
the fact that the Internet and the web have so many users means 
that widely viewed videos (viral videos), for example, can have a 
substantial impact on popular culture.29 Fourth, the colossal 
number of users also creates peer pressure to use the Internet 
and the web to avoid being the odd one out. Fifth, the Internet 
and the web have a similar magnetic attraction to television or 
radio,30 and many people find it difficult to keep their usage 
within healthy limits.31 Indeed, cases involving Internet 
addiction claims are now starting to come before courts in the 
United States.32 Finally, there is significant potential for users 
(including but not limited to children) to view or receive 
unwanted content, either by accident or unavoidably, in the 
course of undertaking routine and normal activities online.33 (I 
shall say much more about this phenomenon and its different 
varieties below.) All of this would suggest that the Internet and 
the web are at least as intrusive and invasive as television or 
radio. Of course, some people will argue that the key respect in 
 
and Networked Public Places, 59 FLA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2007). 
 28. Indeed, this traffic has been shown to impair effective thinking. See 
Julie Rennecker and Daantje Derks, Email Overload: Fine Tuning the Research 
Lens, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DIGITAL MEDIA AT WORK 14, 21 (Daantje Derks & 
Arnold B. Bakker eds., 2013). 
 29. See, e.g., MICHAEL STRANGELOVE, WATCHING YOUTUBE: EXTRAORDINARY 
VIDEOS BY ORDINARY PEOPLE (2010). 
 30. One indication is usage of digital media. Industry researchers found 
that in 2013 time spent by adults in the United States with digital media 
surpassed time spent with television for the first time. Mobile Continues to 
Steal Share of US Adults’ Daily Time Spent with Media, EMARKETER (Apr. 22, 
2014), www.emarketer.com/article.aspx?R=1010782&RewroteTitle=1&nlid=8. 
 31. See Cheng Cecilia & Li Angel Yee-lam, Internet Addiction Prevalence 
and Quality of (Real) Life: A Meta-Analysis of 31 Nations Across Seven World 
Regions, 17 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV., & SOC. NETWORKING 755 (2014). 
 32. See Pacenza v. IBM Corp., 363 F. App’x 128 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 33. See Baumrin, supra note 1, at 258. 
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which the Internet and the web are not intrusive or invasive is 
that they can be easily avoided, but I also intend to directly 
challenge this argument in Part IV. 
In what follows I will argue that at least some of the 
aforementioned idealized examples do involve captive audiences. 
As a preliminary step, I want to briefly reflect on a recent article 
by John B. Major in which he addresses the related issue of 
whether or not cyberstalkers can create captive audiences.34 
Although this issue is both broader and narrower than the issue 
of captive audiences for hate speech on the Internet and the web, 
it nevertheless points in the direction of some potentially 
important questions for my own investigation. To be held captive 
is to be held somewhere, even if the sense of captivity being 
invoked is more metaphorical or figurative than literal.35 In other 
words, the captive audience doctrine makes little sense unless a 
location can be specified. At the very least, there is a difference 
between saying that social networking services, like Twitter, can 
be used as instruments for sending messages directly into 
people’s homes wherein they may be captive audiences, and 
saying that these services can create virtual locations or areas of 
cyberspace wherein people may be captive audiences. At one 
stage, Major claims that “when an individual is made captive to 
speech on the Internet, the captive audience doctrine can, and 
should, apply.”36 One way of reading this claim is to say that the 
location of captivity is the Internet itself. But this raises some 
potentially thorny issues that are not fully explored by Major. 
First, who exactly can be held captive on the Internet? Is it 
persons themselves, their online personae, or just their avatars? 
Second, in what (figurative) sense of captivity can it be 
meaningfully said that a person is being held captive on the 
Internet? Is the sense of captivity in which it can be said that 
someone is held captive on the Internet the same or different 
from the sense of captivity relevant to being held captive in the 
 
 34. John B. Major, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A 
First Amendment Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261a(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117 
(2012). 
 35. For more on the metaphorical aspects of the captive audience doctrine, 
see A. BOSMAJIAN HAIG, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS (1992). 
 36. Major, supra note 34, at 149 n.231 (emphasis added). 
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home? Third, where are people held captive? Is it on the Internet 
or can people also be held captive in places or spaces that exist on 
the Internet such as places and spaces on the web? These sorts of 
questions simply cannot be avoided when one is seeking, as I am 
here, to apply the captive audience doctrine to the Internet and 
the web. 
Finally, before I begin, I want to make it clear at the outset 
that I am proposing a substantial change to American free speech 
doctrine. Presently, in the United States, there is no 
constitutionally proscribable category of speech called “hate 
speech”; indeed, some of the existing case law suggests that hate 
speech is a protected category. At the same time, the case law 
narrowly defines what counts as a “captive audience” that would 
justify regulation of otherwise nonregulatable speech. 
Specifically, the captive audience doctrine does not, as it stands, 
cover audiences who are, in a sense, held captive online. What is 
more, it is fair to say that past cases involving captive audiences 
have tended to involve content and viewpoint neutral restrictions 
on speech, whereas hate speech restrictions are typically content-
based and are sometimes even viewpoint-based. Yet, under 
American free speech doctrine, content- and viewpoint-based 
restrictions on speech are more often than not constitutionally 
impermissible, albeit there are notable exceptions.37 Indeed, 
arguably, hatemongers quickly took up the Internet and the web 
as means of disseminating their invective, not merely because of 
the ease of use and inexpensiveness of online communication, but 
also because they gambled that the expression of online hate 
speech would be as protected as offline hate speech under recent 
interpretations of the First Amendment.38 However, I want to 
emphasize right at the start that I am not seeking here to 
address the question: What is the captive audience doctrine in 
the United States? But instead: What should the captive 
 
 37. See, e.g., Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, 
and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 50–64 (1994); Steven 
Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 651–52 
(2002). 
 38. See Brian Levin, Cyberhate: A Legal and Historical Analysis of 
Extremists’ Use of Computer Networks in America, 45 AM. BEH. SCI. 958 (2002). 
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audience doctrine be? And not: What is the current doctrinal 
position on the constitutionality of content-based hate speech 
regulations in the United States? But rather: What ought to be 
the doctrinal position on such regulations? 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Part II 
sets out the captive audience doctrine as it has been developed by 
courts in the United States, including its hitherto rare 
application to cases involving hate speech. Part III attempts to 
uncover some of the significant interests that might be harmed 
by online hate speech, based on analogies with the home. Here, I 
highlight three types of interests: privacy, autonomy, and 
tranquility. Part IV examines what it means to “avert your eyes,” 
that is, to avoid unwelcome speech, in the Information Age. It 
has been assumed in some quarters that people’s best defense 
against the threat of captivity posed by online technologies rests 
in those technologies themselves—not least in filtering, blocking, 
unfollowing, and reviewing controls. I shall argue that we have 
little reason to be sanguine about the ability of software to filter 
out hate speech without either overfiltering or underfiltering 
content, and that unfollowing and reviewing are only meaningful 
ways of avoiding unwelcome speech if Internet companies change 
the default settings so that these advanced privacy controls are 
automatically enabled. In addition, I explore the burdens 
associated with abstaining from the Internet and the web, either 
partly or entirely. I shall argue that given how important the 
Internet and the web have become to normal human 
functioning—as private persons, workers, consumers, citizens, 
and so on—it is now unreasonable to expect people to live their 
lives offline. It is the fact that receiving online hate speech may 
damage one or more significant interests and cannot be avoided 
without sacrificing (yet further) significant interests that makes 
talk of captive audiences prima facie plausible. Finally, Part V 
explores the implications of these arguments (that online hate 
speech can create or exploit captive audiences), including 
implications for whether or not courts and/or regulators should 
apply the First Amendment doctrine of content and viewpoint 
neutrality and/or the regulatory principle of net neutrality to 
laws/codes/regulations that restrict the use of online hate speech. 
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II. BACKGROUND CASE LAW 
For more than half a century the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized as germane to First Amendment cases the issue of 
whether or not an audience is being held captive to speech, in the 
sense of being “practically helpless” to avoid or escape it.39 The 
Court has also recognized that persons may be captive audiences 
even if the speaker is located in a traditional public forum, such 
as a public street or sidewalk. In other words, in order to reach a 
finding that persons are a captive audience it is unnecessary, 
doctrinally much less extradoctrinally, to redesignate traditional 
public forums as nonpublic forums.40 
At the same time, however, courts in the United States have, 
in effect, narrowly circumscribed the application of the captive 
audience doctrine. In relation to the Internet, the following cases 
stand out. In ACLU v. Reno41 and then later in Reno v. ACLU,42 
courts considered whether or not the application of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA) to indecent materials 
received via the Internet was constitutional vis-à-vis the First 
Amendment. The courts eschewed the suggestion that people 
(children) could be held as captive audiences on the Internet on 
the grounds that “[u]sers seldom encounter content ‘by 
accident’”43 and that “the Internet is not as ‘invasive’ as radio or 
 
 39. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86–87 (1949). 
 40. I have in mind the majority decision in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 
(1988), where the majority held that “Our prior holdings make clear that a 
public street does not lose its status as a traditional public forum simply 
because it runs through a residential neighbourhood.” Id. at 480. And that “No 
particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is necessary; 
all public streets are held in the public trust and are properly considered 
traditional public fora.” Id. at 481. It went on to argue that the focused 
picketing of a house in a residential street, picketing located on the street but 
the noise of which carrying into the house, creates a captive audience. Id. at 
487–48. And that the ban on residential picketing at issue in this case served 
the important interest of protecting residential privacy. Id. at 479–80. This case 
stands in contrast to Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), in 
which the majority did rely on its view that a city transit system is not a First 
Amendment forum in order to support its position that passengers are a captive 
audience. I thank Sonu Bedi for pressing me on these issues. 
 41. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
 42. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 43. 929 F. Supp. at 844. 
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television.”44 Similarly, in United States v. Cassidy45 a U.S. 
District Court (D. Md.) made no mention whatsoever of privacy 
interests or of the captive audience doctrine, only of the 
emotional distress caused by the actions of a cyberstalker. 
Likewise, in cases involving hate speech, more often than 
not, courts have explicitly rejected, declined to fully consider, and 
in some cases failed to even mention, the potential application of 
the captive audience doctrine. In Collin v. Smith,46 for example, a 
U.S. Court of Appeals (7th Cir.) upheld a lower court’s ruling that 
a set of municipal ordinances designed to curb the intended 
marches of Frank Collin and other members of the National 
Socialist Party of America (NSPA) in the predominantly Jewish 
village of Skokie, Illinois were unconstitutional. According to the 
Court, “[t]here need be no captive audience, as Village residents 
may, if they wish, simply avoid the Village Hall for thirty 
minutes on a Sunday afternoon.”47 To take another example, the 
argument that student-on-student hateful abuse is unprotected 
speech under the First Amendment because students are a 
captive audience was put forward by the University of Michigan’s 
defense team in Doe v. University of Michigan48 (This argument 
appeared in the defense brief against the plaintiff’s motion for 
preliminary injunctive relief against the University of Michigan’s 
Policy on Discrimination and Discriminatory Harassment of 
Students in the University Environment.49) Judge Cohn 
consolidated the hearing on the motion with the trial and 
ultimately found no reason even to mention the captive audience 
doctrine in his opinion. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,50 a U.S. 
Supreme Court case concerning the burning of a cross in front of 
the home of an African American family, a unanimous Court 
struck down the City of St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance. It held that since the Minnesota Supreme Court 
 
 44. 521 U.S. at 869. 
 45. 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011). 
 46. 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 47. Id. at 1207. 
 48. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 
 49. Id. Defendant’s Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief, at 13. 
 50. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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construed the St. Paul ordinance as being limited to conduct 
which constituted “fighting words”, the issue of the captive 
audience is “not before us in this case”.51 In Dambrot v. Central 
Michigan University,52 a case involving a college basketball team 
coach’s repeated use of the word “nigger” in team talks used to 
gee up the players, a U.S. Court of Appeals (6th Cir.) made no 
explicit mention of the captive audience doctrine. Nor did the 
U.S. Supreme Court make any direct reference to the doctrine in 
Virginia v. Black,53 a case involving the burning of a cross in an 
open field in plain sight of a state highway and several 
residential homes. 
I believe that courts can, and should, be more willing to apply 
the captive audience doctrine to cases of online hate speech or 
cyberhate. But just to be clear, I do not intend to make the 
unnecessary and implausible argument that whether 
government authorities may regulate otherwise unregulatable 
speech on account of the presence of captive audiences should 
also depend on the presence of online hate speech. That is, I shall 
not argue that the captive audience doctrine should be restricted 
to instances of cyberhate going forward. Clearly there have been 
in the past, and will continue to be in the future, many useful 
applications of the doctrine to circumstances that do not involve 
cyberhate. Rather, as I have already stated, my purpose is to 
argue simply that cases involving cyberhate should not be 
excluded from the possible scope of the captive audience doctrine 
and that there are at least some analogical reasons why they 
should be included. 
III. IDENTIFYING INTERESTS 
In order to be classed as a captive audience it is necessary 
that the relevant speech is unwelcome, meaning that the speech 
harms some or other significant interest. But how should one go 
about identifying the interests being harmed in potential captive 
audience cases? One method is to reflect on the very concept of a 
 
 51. Id. at 414. 
 52. 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 53. 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
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captive audience and to identify a single core interest which is 
harmed in all meaningful instances of that concept. In 1953, for 
example, Charles L. Black Jr. suggested that the relevant 
interest is “a very old freedom, a freedom to which, in some 
sense, all the others are dedicated handmaidens—the freedom of 
the mind.”54 Since then, however, the captive audience doctrine 
has been applied to various different contexts and situations,55 
some of which may not have anything essentially to do with 
freedom of the mind, if that means being left in peace to 
contemplate the objects of some or other belief or disbelief. 
Sometimes the interest harmed by speech is of the non-cognitive 
or emotional variety; in other contexts or situations it is an 
interest in exercising a capacity for choice that is nonidentical 
with contemplating and feeling. So it may be extremely difficult 
to identify a single core interest that is implicated in all cases to 
which courts have, or might in the future, apply the captive 
audience doctrine. 
A second method begins with a set of exemplar cases 
involving putative captive audiences and builds up from these 
exemplars a working list of significant interests. This seems to 
have been the method employed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Cohen v. California.56 Highlighting Rowan v. United States Post 
Office Department57 as an exemplar captive audience case, the 
Court reaffirmed its position that captive audiences in the home 
suffer an invasion of privacy.58 But the Court also made it clear 
that people can be captive audiences even if they are outside the 
sanctuary of the home and, what is more, set down a test for 
determining when the doctrine can be applied outside of the 
home: namely, when “substantial privacy interests are being 
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”59 In short, the 
Court identified the interest at stake in the exemplar case and 
 
 54. Charles L. Black Jr., He Cannot Choose but Hear: The Plight of the 
Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 960, 966 (1953). 
 55. Cf. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, supra note 7, at 
2312. 
 56. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 57. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
 58. 403 U.S. at 21. 
 59. Id. 
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then utilized that interest as a basis for a more general test.60 
Employing a similar method, but starting with a larger set of 
exemplars, Marcy Strauss proffers the following list of rights 
which she believes are implicated in captive audience cases: the 
right to choose what information one receives, the right to repose, 
and the right to be free from offense.61 
A third method of identifying significant interests at stake in 
potential captive audience cases is contextualism. This method 
involves reflecting closely on the nature of the contexts or 
situations in which persons might be said to be captive audiences 
and then trying to determine which interests are most naturally 
associated with or germane to those contexts. According to 
Richard H. Fallon Jr., for example, “[w]hen the so-called captive 
audience cases are read in conjunction, the character of the place 
seems more important than the degree of audience ‘captivity’ in 
explaining the applications of captive audience doctrine.”62 
Although she is not explicit, Caroline Mala Corbin also seems to 
employ this method. She takes different contexts in turn—the 
home, the workplace, the polling station—and in each context 
sets forth the most germane interest which is being harmed—the 
right to privacy, the right to equal protection, the right to vote.63 
My own hunch is that the best approach combines the second 
and third methods: that each would be incomplete without the 
other. On the one hand, in order to understand, using the second 
method, whether or not analogies can be drawn between 
exemplar cases of captive audiences in offline and online 
contexts, it will be necessary to engage in contextual analyses, 
using the third method, of the nature and function of different 
parts of the Internet and web. On the other hand, the third 
method is likely to produce plausible results only when combined 
with the second. For one thing, I think it would be mistaken to 
 
 60. This is a highly abstract test, of course, almost as abstract as the 
captive audience doctrine itself. For an attempt to inject greater precision into 
this test, however, see Geoffrey R. Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public 
Places, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 263–64 (1974). 
 61. Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, supra note 7, at 
106–16. 
 62. Fallon, supra note 7, at 18. 
 63. Corbin, supra note 8, at 951–65. 
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assume that the home, the workplace, the university, the 
cemetery chapel, crematorium, graveside, or anywhere that 
funeral services and death rituals are performed, for instance, 
must necessarily implicate very different interests. Not all 
relevant differences between contexts or situations equate to 
differences in the genera of interests at stake. Furthermore, it 
seems to me that courts in the United States have been willing to 
extend the captive audience doctrine to contexts other than the 
home only to the extent that analogies can be drawn between 
those other contexts and that exemplar. And part of what 
vindicates these analogies is the similarity of the interests at 
stake, and not merely the context. 
For reasons of space, in what follows I shall investigate only 
two types of contexts. The first is the home, a context to which 
traditionally the captive audience doctrine has been applied; and 
the second is the Internet and the web, a family of contexts to 
which the application of the captive audience doctrine remains 
highly controversial. I shall argue that different species of the 
same genera of significant interests can be found in both types of 
contexts. 
A. The Home 
As touched upon already, one species of interest implicated in 
potential captive audience cases involving the home is privacy in 
the home. This interest reflects the basic idea that the home (and 
perhaps, also, residential streets in which homes are located) is a 
place where the right to avoid intrusion has particular force.64 
This interest may even rest on a conceptualization of the home 
as, by definition, the sort of place in which people have a right to 
be protected from unwanted speech, unlike some public spaces.65 
A second significant interest is autonomy in the home. This 
interest can be divided into two types: substantive and formal. A 
substantive interest in autonomy in the home means, to borrow 
the words of Zechariah Chafee, that “home is one place where a 
 
 64. See 397 U.S. at 738; Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988). 
 65. See, e.g., LORNA FOX O’MAHONY, CONCEPTUALISING HOME: THEORIES, 
LAWS AND POLICIES (2007). 
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man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he 
desires.”66 Protecting a substantive interest in autonomy in the 
home means protecting the home as a place for personal 
reflection or quiet contemplation about what to believe and even 
how to behave.67 Respecting a formal interest in autonomy in the 
home, by contrast, has to do with respecting a person’s right to 
choose for him or herself what information or messages he or she 
will receive within the home.68 In other words, what matters is 
the role played by the agent in exercising his or her right to 
protection from unwanted speech. Here, the thought is that it is 
not ideal for governmental institutions to instigate the blocking 
of unwanted mail, even if in the name of protecting recipients’ 
substantive autonomy; it is better if the recipient exercises his or 
her own autonomy in taking steps to block mail using 
governmental institutions merely as instruments. Indeed, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has been more willing to uphold statutes or 
ordinances that place the onus on the recipient of unwanted mail 
to exercise his or her autonomy in taking action to stop the mail 
by informing the postal service that the mail is unwanted, rather 
than those that give the postal service the power to make a 
rebuttable presumption that certain mail is unwanted (on behalf 
of citizens).69 
A third significant interest is tranquility in the home. This 
interest relies on an understanding of the home as a sanctuary; a 
refuge from the stresses and strains of working life or from the 
cacophony of the public square; a place of serenity and repose, 
rest and recuperation, repair and replenishment.70 If the home is 
 
 66. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1954). 
 67. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949). 
 68. See Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, supra note 7, at 
109. 
 69. Compare Rowan, 397 U.S. 728 with Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 
U.S. 72 (1983). See also Troyer v. Town of Babylon, 483 F. Supp. 1135, 1138 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980). The same point is made in Strauss, Redefining the Captive 
Audience Doctrine, supra note 7, at 109. 
 70. See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144, 152–53 (1943); 
City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 404–07 (1971); Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176, 1185 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
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“the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and the sick,”71 then (it 
has been argued) the burning of a cross in front of the home of an 
African American family, for example, must surely constitute a 
most serious breach of the citadel walls.72 How could a family be 
expected to enjoy relaxation and restful sleep amid the sights, 
sounds, and smells of a fiery cross? 
Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the 
aforementioned interests are at stake in most cases of captive 
audiences in the home. Could not exactly the same interests be 
involved in each of the cases listed in Part I involving the 
Internet and the web? After all, “[t]he Internet, like broadcasting, 
can also be characterized as a medium that intrudes into the 
home.”73 So, for example, “Tweets do in a sense ‘enter the home’ 
as they come up on the computer screen of the victim.”74 Indeed, 
the fact that someone can be physically located within their own 
home but at the same time send and receive content which is 
virtually located within online public spaces may challenge 
traditional distinctions between public and private spaces.75 
However, we must also be sensitive to the fact that with the 
growing sophistication and prevalence of mobile devices (e.g., 
smartphones, tablets, laptops, smartwatches) people are 
increasingly gaining access to the Internet and the web outside of 
their homes. And this is also likely to change how we think about 
the distinction between public and private spaces,76 as well as 
how we understand the scope of the captive audience doctrine 
and how we define the interests at stake. At the very least, it 
raises the question of whether or not it can be meaningful to say, 
even if figuratively, that an individual is made captive to speech 
on the Internet or in places and spaces found on the web. Putting 
this another way, if online hate speech is capable of reaching 
people not merely at home but also at work, in cars, on public 
 
 71. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125 (1969). 
 72. See Eberle, supra note 4, at 1191–92. 
 73. William D. Araiza, Captive Audiences, Children and the Internet, 41 
BRANDEIS L.J. 397, 398 (2003). 
 74. Major, supra note 34, at 153. 
 75. See Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, supra note 7, at 
2311–12. 
 76. Cf. Zick, supra note 27, at 26–30. 
2017] Averting Your Eyes in the Information Age 
23 
transit vehicles, in public spaces, in restaurants, or quite simply 
wherever people take their mobile devices, then we at least ought 
to investigate if there is a plausible sense in which people can be 
captive audiences on the Internet or in places and spaces found 
on the web over and above the sense in which they may be held 
captive audiences in each of the aforementioned physical spaces. 
This further investigation, I believe, must involve a proper 
account of the significant interests that may be harmed by online 
hate speech—interests of a sort that can be relevant to the issue 
of whether or not the captive audience doctrine is applicable to 
the Internet and the web. 
B. The Internet and the Web 
In this subpart I shall argue that online hate speech can 
harm three significant interests which although are different 
species to the three interests outlined in the previous subpart, 
are nonetheless species belonging to the same genera. 
The first is privacy on the Internet and the web. It is tempting 
to think that when accessing the Internet or the web one can no 
longer claim a right to privacy for the simple reason that one is 
choosing to let the outside world in. But I believe that this aspect 
of received wisdom about the Internet and the web is 
problematic. For one thing, users of the Internet and the web are 
able to create their own virtual homes within multi-user domains 
(MUDS), massively multiplayer online worlds (MMOWs), 
massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs), 
and multi-user virtual environments (MUVEs). And the existence 
of these virtual homes surely opens up the possibility of 
violations of the privacy rights of avatars residing inside virtual 
homes that are located within larger virtual worlds.77 
In addition to this, it seems to me that social networking 
profile pages, including timelines, could be viewed as close 
cousins of virtual homes, wherein the privacy rights of “real” 
people may also be threatened.78 Now it is certainly true that the 
 
 77. See, e.g., GREG LASTOWKA, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE NEW LAWS OF ONLINE 
WORLDS (2010). Cf. Darren MacLennan & Jason Sartin, Review of F.A.T.A.L., 
RPG (Oct. 30, 2009), www.rpg.net/reviews/archive/14/14567.phtml. 
 78. Cf. Susanna Paasonen, Immaterial Homes, Personal Spaces and the 
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 12 
24 
profile pages which users have the opportunity to create on 
mainstream social networking websites, like Facebook, Myspace, 
and Qzone, are quite different from virtual homes in that they do 
not contain virtual walls, ceilings, doors, furniture, and so on.79 
Nevertheless, these websites offer users a chance to create what 
might be called “online homes.” These online homes (profile 
pages) share similar features with real homes. They are spaces 
that users can build themselves, the structure and form of which 
they have some scope to control and customize to look a certain 
way. They are spaces that users can fill with personalized 
meaningful objects, such as pictures, videos, and text, so as to 
give the feeling of homeliness. They are spaces into which users 
can invite their friends and family, and in which a great deal of 
personal time can be spent relaxing. So there is a sense in which 
when people are spending time in their profile pages they are 
spending time “at home.” Indeed, part of the lure of social 
networking websites for students studying overseas, for example, 
is that they can create a home away from home that exists 
online.80 Moreover, because mobile devices enable people to 
access the Internet and the web wherever they go, leaving one’s 
real or offline home is no longer a barrier to spending time in 
one’s online home. No doubt when people carry their mobile 
devices with them this can make wherever they go feel more 
homely because of the devices themselves, akin to a child carrying 
around a much-loved teddy bear. But there is also a sense, I 
think, in which mobile devices enable people to take their online 
homes with them.81 The important point here is that the 
existence of online homes might actually increase rather than 
decrease the extent to which people have privacy interests when 
 
Internet as a Rhetorical Terrain, in HOMES IN TRANSFORMATION: DWELLING, 
MOVING, BELONGING (Hanna Johansson & Kirsi Saarikangas eds., 2009). 
 79. Interestingly, users are able to create virtual homes on more specialist 
social networking websites. Consider the Guest Rooms function on Habbo. 
 80. Of course, profile pages, like other spaces on the Web, are materially 
embodied by servers, cables, satellite transmitters, electromagnetic radio 
waves, receivers, computer screens, mobile device displays, pixels, and so on. 
But it is not these that I call home. The online home (profile page) merely 
supervenes upon these physical objects. 
 81. See also DAVID MORLEY, MEDIA, MODERNITY, AND TECHNOLOGY: THE 
GEOGRAPHY OF THE NEW 205 (2007). 
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they access the Internet or the web. 
Taking the idea of online homes to its logical conclusion, I 
would argue that the act of Facebook tagging described in Case 1: 
Tagging, constitutes an intrusion into a place of privacy for the 
Muslim student. When hate speech finds its way onto people’s 
social networking profile pages, and therefore into their online 
homes as I am calling them, they may experience a sense of 
invasion of privacy which is not dissimilar to the feeling they 
might experience if someone broke into their real home and 
painted hate messages on their walls and mirrors. It may be the 
case that the student can choose to remove the tag once he 
notices it, and thereby put a stop to the intrusion. But this does 
not prevent the intrusion itself. Unsurprisingly, then, in response 
to user requests for greater privacy in respect of tagging, in 2011 
Facebook introduced a new Advanced Privacy Control which 
allows users to review tags that Friends add to their profile page 
timelines before they appear. Once this control is enabled, users 
can approve or reject any photo or post in which they are tagged 
before it becomes visible to anyone else on their profile page 
timelines.82 
The interest in privacy on the Internet and the web need not 
be exclusively analogized to privacy in the home. Another 
analogy worth pursuing is with privacy in the context or 
situation of a funeral or death ritual. It is widely supposed that 
funeral mourners ought to be left alone to mourn in peace, 
without being distracted by unwanted speech.83 Thus, courts in 
the United States have ruled in several cases that funeral 
picketing by the Westboro Baptist Church has either created or 
exploited captive audiences.84 Arguably, a similar privacy 
 
 82. Although the reviewing control allows someone to prevent a tag from 
appearing on her own profile page Timeline, the tag will still remain on the 
tagger’s Timeline and can be viewed by anyone who is friends with the tagger, 
including mutual friends of the taggee. So there is also potentially a false light 
privacy interest in not allowing other people to tag pictures that place oneself in 
a false, misleading, or distorted light before ones Facebook friends. 
 83. Levinson, supra note 5, at 67–69. 
 84. See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 
2006); Phelps-Roper v. Nixon, 504 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (W.D. Mo. 2007); 
Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 618–19 (N.D. Ohio 2007); Phelps-
Roper v. Strickland, 539 F.3d 356, 362–72 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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interest is at stake in the set of circumstances found in Case 3: 
Trolling. In this case, the friends of a deceased couple are not left 
alone to partake in processes of online grieving, remembrance, 
and memorialization. Instead, their privacy is invaded by people 
who wish to hijack the virtual space to espouse and promote their 
ideology of racial difference, separation, and segregation. The 
mere fact that the processes of grieving, remembrance, and 
memorialization that are being intruded upon take place over the 
Internet and on the web as opposed to at a cemetery chapel is an 
immaterial difference. If people want to take part in funerals, 
they must go to the places designated for that event by common 
agreement or convention. If people want to take part in online 
memorials, they too must visit the websites set up for such 
activities by conventional practice. 
A second significant interest is autonomy in using the 
Internet and the web. Of course, there are different senses in 
which cyberhate can affront the autonomy of others. A good deal 
of online hate speech takes the form of denying that a certain 
group of people are even capable of autonomously choosing for 
themselves how to think and how to behave.85 However, I am 
more interested in the ways in which some online hate speech 
can harm substantial interests in autonomy of audiences, by 
undermining, subverting, or circumventing their normal 
processes of rational reflection.86 Once again, this argument can 
be applied to different types of audiences of online hate speech, 
including not only people who are the subject matter of cyberhate 
speech but also people who receive cyberhate but who are not its 
subject matter. Consider Case 4: Online Vandalism. Here the 
hate speaker is exploiting an online encyclopedia, Wikipedia, in 
order to influence and persuade the audience to react to Catholics 
as he would like them to. He is attempting to change attitudes, to 
stir up hatred, and even to incite acts of discrimination through 
both the power of his rhetoric and the power of the brand, 
 
 85. See Heyman, supra note 4, at 175. 
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Wikipedia. The strategy is partly to reach a large audience but 
also partly to make that audience believe that the ideas have 
some credibility or standing; the fact that they are posted on a 
well-known, and to some extent trusted, website could make 
readers give the ideas more credence than if they had stumbled 
across them somewhere else on the web. The question is: should 
people be free to access online encyclopedias without being 
confronted with such forms of unwanted influence and 
persuasion? 
No doubt some people will argue that the moment 
individuals go online they can no longer reasonably expect to 
shut themselves up in their own ideas. The web is a public space, 
or is partly composed of public spaces, after all. What is more, 
these are spaces to some extent defined by attempts at influence 
and persuasion. To expect the web to provide opportunities for 
pristine reflection—akin to somebody’s study or drawing room—
is to fundamentally misconceive what the web is or should be (so 
the objection runs). But whilst it is certainly true that parts of 
the web do serve the purposes that the hate speaker seeks, it 
would be overly simplistic to assume that the same holds for all 
parts of the web. Surely the primary function of online 
encyclopedias is to provide user-generated sources of reliable 
information: to create, organize, and provide quick access to vast 
numbers of entries which are capable of acting as reference 
works for people wishing to discover or confirm facts or as concise 
summaries of bodies of knowledge which people can easily digest 
and utilize as starting points for further research. Users of online 
encyclopedias will often treat the information they find as source 
material for their reflections about what to believe. I would 
suggest that such information-gathering sessions might be 
among the situations when we have a duty to let other people 
alone to reflect about what to believe. Rules against online 
vandalism may be on a par with library rules requiring patrons 
not to write in or add handwritten annotations to library books 
(so-called library-book vandalism) so as not to distract or disturb 
the information-gathering of other patrons. 
Third, I believe that some online hate speech can harm a 
significant interest in emotional tranquility on the Internet and 
the web. The general idea that hate speech can harm emotional 
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tranquility is not new of course. In the 1980s, Richard Delgado 
and Mari Matsuda pointed to the immediate or short-term severe 
emotional distress that may be suffered by individuals as a result 
of experiencing interpersonal racist abuse.87 More recently, Eric 
Barendt has suggested that “[t]he best argument for restricting 
racist hate speech is undoubtedly that a state has a compelling 
interest to protect members of target groups against the 
psychological injuries inflicted by the most pernicious forms of 
extremist hate speech.”88 Steven Heyman highlights the harm 
that may be done to the victim’s emotional tranquility by cross 
burning and Nazi marches, which he calls a violation of the right 
to personality.89 Elsewhere I have argued for a retheorization of 
certain torts and delicts in cases of targeted hate speech as 
involving violations of dignity through degradation and 
humiliation, which include subjective as well as objective 
dimensions.90 I wish to extend these lines of reasoning to hate 
speech on the Internet and the web. I want to focus on types of 
online hate speech that are capable of causing intense feelings of 
fear, anger, resentment, shame, embarrassment, humiliation, 
self-loathing, distress, loneliness, and exclusion. 
It does not take much of a leap of imagination to see how the 
people on the receiving end of the online hate speech in Case 2: 
Hate Sites, Case 5: Copycat Parodies, and Case 6: 
Cyberharassment, could suffer damage to their emotional 
tranquility as a consequence. In Case 2: Hate Sites, for example, 
the father who comes across a website dedicated to tarnishing 
the memory of his deceased son and reviling him personally 
cannot remember his son or think about himself as a father 
without a significant degree of mental anguish—because he 
cannot separate his memories and thoughts about his son from 
 
 87. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial 
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his recollection of the words on the hate site.91 Does it matter 
that his exposure to the hate speech was short-lived? Could there 
be a relevant difference between semipermanent hate speech 
that is painted onto neighborhood walls and which someone is 
forced to walk past repeatedly over a period of weeks or months, 
and hate speech that temporarily appears in an email or on a 
website and which someone sees only for a fleeting moment and 
then never again?92 Even if some people would suffer severe 
emotional distress only as a result of accumulated exposure to 
hate speech over a prolonged period, it is still possible that other 
people could suffer lasting damage to their emotional tranquility 
even after a limited exposure to cyberhate. If so, then this may 
undermine an argument that says recipients of online hate 
speech are not captive audiences simply because they can delete 
emails and refrain from revisiting hate sites. I shall come back to 
this issue in Part IV. 
In order to fully understand the special ways in which online 
hate speech may pose a threat to emotional tranquility, it is 
necessary to reflect further on the nature of the Internet and the 
web. It has been argued by critical race theorists in the past that 
racist hate speech “can cause mental, emotional, or even physical 
harm to their target, especially if delivered in front of others.”93 
But what if the number of others is potentially vast? Social 
networking websites (e.g., Facebook, Myspace, Qzone), blogging 
platforms and instant messaging services (e.g., Twitter, 
WordPress, Tumblr), photo and video sharing websites (e.g., 
YouTube, Vimeo, Flickr, and Instagram), and Internet forums 
and message boards (e.g., 4chan) enable people to cultivate and 
enjoy supersociability. Supersociability has partly to do with the 
fact that ordinary people can post opinions and information, 
exchange messages, be friends, and share pictures and videos 
with more people than at any time in human history. But this 
 
 91. The hate speech qualifies as such not merely by its tone and content 
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 92. Cf. Jeremy Waldron, 2009 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, Dignity and 
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supersociability can be a double-edged sword. An awareness that 
comments, messages, images, and videos are capable of being 
seen by a large number of strangers on the Internet and the web, 
as well as by countless friends and family members, could 
potentially increase the inherent risk, raise the intensity, or even 
transform the quality of feelings of fear, anger, resentment, 
degredation, shame, embarrassment, humiliation, self-loathing, 
or loneliness which may come about as a consequence of exposure 
to hate speech.94 This may be an important dimension of Case 1: 
Tagging, where the tagged picture and comment is visible to all 
of the student’s Facebook friends. 
The supersociability made possible by the Internet and the 
web might also be responsible for amplifying a deep-seated 
human need to be esteemed and for exacerbating the emotional 
toll of not being so. This can be seen most vividly in Case 5: 
Copycat Parodies. Part of what is at stake in this case is 
something that explains why many people are attracted to the 
Internet and the web in the first place: the impulse to cultivate 
and enjoy likeability. It matters to people whether or not they are 
popular among online communities—and it matters socially as 
well as professionally. Social networking websites and messaging 
services, blogging platforms, video sharing websites, and Internet 
forums and message boards enable individuals to become the 
sorts of people whom it is possible for very large numbers of other 
people to “like” because, for example, they are funny, cool, nice to 
look at, well-informed, chatty, savvy, and so forth. Indeed, there 
is an increasing tendency for online technologies to facilitate and 
foreground quantitative tools for measuring online likeability. 
Consider the number of Twitter followers, retweets, mentions, 
and heart clicks a user can amass; the number of Facebook 
friends and post likes; the number of Internet forum and message 
board comments and webpage visits; the number of Instagram 
likes; and so on. Online hate speech poses a threat to likeability. 
Realizing or fearing that one is not or will not be liked by other 
members of the online communities to which one belongs because 
one has been the target or subject matter of online hate speech 
may harm the emotional tranquility of people who are 
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emotionally invested in being liked online. This in turn may be 
related to very basic, hardwired human fears of social 
ostracization and isolation. (Of course, the fear might prove to be 
unfounded if the parody actually increases the likeability of the 
victim in the eyes of others. But even this eventual good outcome 
might not transform the parody from unwelcome to welcome 
speech if the unwelcomeness is defined in terms of the risk of a 
bad outcome.) 
I wish to make two things clear at this juncture. First, what I 
have been presenting in the last two paragraphs are hypotheses 
for consideration as opposed to proven facts. (I have written 
elsewhere of the importance of being upfront in debates on hate 
speech law about what evidence does or does not exist.95) 
Nevertheless, if these hypotheses are accurate, then, I believe, 
they would add considerable force to the proposition that some 
online hate speech can be unwelcome because it harms 
significant interests. 
Second, I do not take myself to have exhausted the list of 
significant interests that might be harmed by exposure to online 
hate speech. I offer interests in privacy, autonomy, and emotional 
tranquility on the Internet and the web merely with a view to 
repurposing the captive audience doctrine. If the aim were to 
identify interests harmed by online hate speech simpliciter, no 
doubt one could point to various other interests, such as interests 
in nonsubordination; interests in freedom from oppression; 
interests in the protection of human dignity; and interests in the 
public assurance of civic dignity.96 For instance, it might be 
argued that part of the harm of hate speech in public forums on 
the Internet and the web is that such speech can function like 
“keep out” signs. Online hate speech either directly or indirectly 
tells certain groups of people that they are not welcome in 
cyberspace, as well as not being welcome in society as whole. 
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IV. AVERTING YOUR EYES IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
In order to show that online hate speech can create or exploit 
captive audiences, it is not enough merely to show that the hate 
speech received or accessed through the Internet or the web is 
unwelcome (i.e., damages a significant interest). It must also be 
demonstrated that the recipients are unwilling. Part IV aims at 
making that case. 
A. Practically Helpless to Avoid Speech 
In this subpart, I want to challenge the assumption that in 
most cases it is possible to avoid or escape unwelcome messages 
and content received or accessed through the Internet or on the 
web. If left unchallenged this assumption would obstruct the 
proposed extension of the captive audience doctrine to online 
hate speech. After all, the U.S. Supreme Court has been 
consistent in affirming that people are a captive audience to 
speech only if they are practically helpless to avoid or escape it. 
In Cohen, for example, the Court ruled that when Cohen wore a 
jacket that displayed the phrase “Fuck the Draft” in the public 
corridors of a courthouse this did not create a captive audience 
because others “could effectively avoid further bombardment of 
their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.”97 Similarly, in 
Spence v. Washington98 the Court held that passersby who might 
have been offended by a flag hung from a second-floor apartment 
window were not a captive audience because they “could easily 
have avoided the display.”99 And, in Heffron v. International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,100 Justice Brennan 
opined that “[b]ecause fairgoers are fully capable of saying ‘no’ to 
persons seeking their attention and then walking away, they are 
not members of a captive audience.”101 I want to explode some of 
these ways of thinking about captive audiences or, more 
precisely, some analogous ways of thinking about the 
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practicalities of avoiding or escaping online hate speech. 
Let me begin with this question: Is it fair to say that someone 
who receives an email or Tweet containing hate speech or who 
comes across a hate site is not a captive audience simply by 
virtue of the fact that he or she can delete the email or Tweet 
upon first reading and can elect not to look again at the hate 
site? I believe not. The point of averting one’s eyes is not merely 
to avoid the speech but also to do so whilst at the same time 
avoiding harm to significant interests. If the harm occurs from 
the first moment that the hate speech is received and can persist 
even after one has averted one’s eyes, then averting one’s eyes is 
not a practical means of avoiding the harm. Indeed, in FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation102 the U.S. Supreme Court considered and 
rejected the idea that listeners could be reasonably expected to 
turn off the radio upon hearing offensive material. 
To say that someone may avoid further offense by turning off 
the radio when he or she hears indecent language is like saying 
that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. 
Similarly, someone may hang up on an indecent phone call, but 
that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity to 
avoid a harm that has already taken place.103 
The fact that it may not always be possible to psychologically 
unread online hate speech once it has been read is especially 
germane to the interest in emotional tranquility discussed in 
Part III.B. In Case 2: Hate Sites, for example, the father’s 
emotional distress occurred as soon as he read the hate site, and 
so he could not have avoided the harm simply by closing down 
the page and never looking at it again. Whilst the father can 
avoid the website from that point onwards, the emotional 
damage cannot be so easily erased or undone. These reflections 
point to a relevant distinction between two kinds of averting 
one’s eyes: ex ante, before one has even received or read 
unwelcome speech; and ex post, after one has already received or 
read the relevant speech. Averting one’s eyes ex ante may well be 
the more important kind when it comes to applying the captive 
audience doctrine to online hate speech. 
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Following on from this distinction, I now want to explore 
another aspect of received wisdom about the Internet and the 
web mentioned in Part I: that computer-based communication 
services provide the user with a range of effective methods with 
which to avoid receiving unwelcome content.104 This is averting 
one’s eyes ex ante. In practical terms it could mean seeking out 
only those mobile network providers and Internet service 
providers who offer content-limited access to the Internet and the 
web through network-based Internet-security filters which block 
access to hate sites (amongst other unwelcome websites). Or it 
could mean users availing themselves of the browser-based 
Internet-security controls offered by the major Internet browsers 
and web search engines (e.g., AltaVista, Bing, Internet Explorer, 
Mozilla Firefox, Google, Safari, Opera, Yahoo), which block 
websites based on content. Or it might involve the use of email 
filtering functions provided by email software packages (e.g., 
Outlook, Hotmail, Gmail) which place filters on emails 
containing certain words in the subject line, such as by sending 
them directly to spam folders. Or it could mean downloading 
specialist third party software packages (e.g., CyberPatrol’s 
CyberList, K9, DansGuardian) which, once activated, will deny 
access to any websites that fall within the software providers’ 
proscribed categories. This would be equivalent to informing the 
post office that one does not wish to receive mail from a 
particular list of senders who are known for sending hate mail, 
for instance. 
However, these technologies suffer from three main 
problems. First, they can have a tendency to underfilter. Online 
hate speakers can disguise email messages and websites to look 
harmless. And they may be able to bypass filters by changing the 
subject lines or titles of the emails or websites, or even by 
changing words within the emails or websites themselves. In 
short, there are forms of covert hate speech that filtering 
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technologies are inadequately equipped to filter out.105 More 
generally, these technologies are susceptible to the constantly 
changing forms of hate speech transmitted through the Internet 
and found on the web, and are liable to lag behind the changing 
techniques used by online hate speakers. This seems to have 
been the fate of the Anti-Defamation League’s HateFilter 
software.106 If levels of underfiltering are significant, then “it 
could be argued that the inability to filter out undesirable speech 
creates an unacceptable dilemma for a would-be user: use the 
Internet and subject yourself to the risk of encountering 
[unwelcome] speech, or abstain altogether from using the 
medium.”107 Second, these technologies can have a tendency to 
overfilter. Imprecise software might block access to websites on 
which hateful words are mentioned but not used.108 Consider 
websites that are devoted to discussing the problem of hatred; 
that provide support for the victims of hate speech; that monitor 
and report the use of cyberhate; that provide platforms for 
counterspeech; and so on.109 Is it reasonable to expect people to 
risk inadvertently cutting themselves off from helpful public 
discourse about hate speech in order to avoid hate speech itself? I 
shall return to the general issue of unreasonable burdens in a 
moment. Third, user-oriented software solutions, which require 
users to set up, manage, and periodically adjust or customize 
content filters, could be de facto accessible only to computer and 
mobile device users who feel sufficiently knowledgeable and 
competent.110 People who are, or perceive themselves to be, 
technologically illiterate may end up being practically helpless to 
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avoid online hate speech except by going offline entirely. 
Now it might be pointed out at this stage that in Ashcroft v. 
ACLU111 and ACLU v. Gonzales112 the courts considered expert 
testimony and surveyed evidence from governmental and other 
studies relating to both the effectiveness and ease of use of 
Internet filtering software that can be used by parents to prevent 
children from accessing pornographic material over the Internet. 
They concluded that underfiltering, overfilting, and difficulties of 
use were not significant problems. However, hitherto courts in 
the United States have not investigated whether or not the same 
can be said for Internet filtering software that can be used by 
potential victims of cyberhate to prevent themselves from 
receiving or accidentally accessing hate speech through the 
Internet or on the web. 
Another method that users of the Internet and the web can 
employ in order to avoid receiving unwelcome content is to avail 
themselves of the blocking and unfollowing functions provided by 
social networking websites, like Facebook, and Internet 
messaging services and microblogging platforms, like Twitter. 
Consider again Cassidy, a case involving an indictment for the 
federal crime of intentionally causing substantial emotional 
distress to another person by way of an interactive computer 
service.113 Cassidy’s incessant Tweets mentioned Zeoli in foul and 
abusive terms and eventually caused her to deactivate her 
Twitter account.114 Before that time, Zeoli addressed Internet 
users on a frequent basis from her own verified Twitter account, 
which had 17,221 followers.115 Major argues that “normatively, 
the victims of cyberstalking should not have to quit Twitter to 
avoid that message.”116 But the practical question is whether 
Zeoli really needed to quit Twitter in order to avoid Cassidy’s 
unwelcome tweets. Could she not have continued to use Twitter 
and chosen to unfollow and block Cassidy? In this way, Cassidy’s 
tweets would not have appeared on Zeoli’s home timeline, he 
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could not have sent her direct messages, and he could not have 
seen Zeoli’s tweets or other account information. Major, however, 
rebuffs this reasoning, “The captive audience doctrine is 
especially applicable to cyberstalking when cyberstalkers go out 
of their way to make their speech unavoidable, such as through 
the use of multiple usernames.”117 Perhaps Major has in mind the 
fact that when other Twitter users, including Cassidy, referred to 
Zeoli in their tweets, these mentions would have appeared in her 
mentions tab, whether or not she followed them. However, this 
response overlooks an important privacy function available to all 
Twitter users. Users now have the ability to click the “People You 
Follow” function on the mentions tab.118 This enables a mentions 
filter such that the mentions tab will only display mentions from 
followed users.119 By enabling this privacy function and only 
following people they know, Twitter users can now avoid 
unwelcome mentions.120 
Twitter, then, does provide some privacy controls that allow 
people to prevent unwelcome speech from being sent directly to 
them.121 It is not alone. Recall the discussion of Case 1: Tagging, 
in Part III.B above. Here I pointed to Facebook’s advanced 
privacy controls that allow users to review tags that people add 
to their profile page timelines before the tags actually appear or 
go live. Arguably, the existence of these types of privacy controls 
weakens the claim that people can be captive audiences to 
unwelcome tags and mentions on social networking websites and 
Internet messaging services. Then again, perhaps the captive 
audience claim will not be fatally weakened by the existence of 
these controls so long as Facebook and Twitter continue to make 
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the default settings for these controls disenabled rather than 
enabled. The crucial point is that Facebook and Twitter users 
must take active steps to enable the “Reviewing” and “People You 
Follow” controls, which means they must first come to know that 
these controls exist and then make efforts to locate and enable 
them. The problem is that many Facebook and Twitter users may 
be simply unaware of these advanced privacy controls until after 
they have had a bad experience with unwelcome tags or 
mentions. And it is not clear whether users of Facebook and 
Twitter can be reasonably expected to go through every setting 
and control at the point at which they begin using these services 
and websites. Therefore, if it is unreasonable to expect this level 
of due diligence, then these sorts of cases do involve captive 
audiences, other things remaining equal. If it is not 
unreasonable, then it seems likely that they do not involve 
captive audiences, other things remaining equal. 
I have investigated some of the technical difficulties 
associated with filtering, blocking, unfollowing, and reviewing. 
Yet these do not exhaust the types of practical impediments that 
could be faced by people when it comes to avoiding online hate 
speech. Some necessary avoidance behaviors might cut against 
the grain of psychological facts about ordinary human beings. 
There is judicial precedent for this sort of analysis. In Erznoznik 
v. Jacksonville,122 for example, the Court held as invalid an 
ordinance making it unlawful for a drive-in movie theatre to 
exhibit films containing nudity when the screen is visible from a 
public street, on the grounds that “the offended viewer readily 
can avert his eyes.”123 In his dissent, however, Chief Justice 
Burger observed that “when films are projected on such screens 
the combination of color and animation against a necessarily 
dark background is designed to, and results in, attracting and 
holding the attention of all observers.”124 Indeed, it has recently 
been suggested that the human psychological propensity to be 
drawn to bright shiny objects stems from our basic need for 
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water.125 Could a similar form of argument be made for hate 
speech on the Internet and the web? 
To be sure, many parts of the web are not the sorts of places 
that a person can literally stumble upon by accident, that is, 
without any forewarning of the likely content.126 Web search 
engines present titles and snippet views of the contents of the 
websites listed on the search results pages. As such, it might be 
supposed that people can be expected not to click on any results 
which suggest, hint at, or contain snippets of unwanted content. 
Surely, we can expect (so the argument goes) the parents of 
deceased military personnel who put their children’s names into 
web search engines not to click on links to websites with names 
such as www.godhatesfags.com. However, could not the captive 
audience doctrine be applied even to cases where people had 
some foresight or warning that they were about to access hate 
speech if they nevertheless felt in some sense compelled, 
psychologically, to click on the link? The compulsion might stem 
from an instinct for self-preservation. People may feel driven to 
seek out information that may be useful for keeping them safe 
even if that information is emotionally painful. Thus, previous 
victims of racist abuse might feel compelled to educate 
themselves about online hate speech so that they are less likely 
to be blindsided by an escalation of hatred. Alternatively, looking 
at emails, websites, or other online content even when one has an 
inkling that it might contain cyberhate could reflect a human 
tendency toward morbid curiosity. Many people experience an 
irresistible urge to enquire further about subjects that they 
suspect, or know, will be upsetting to them and which on one 
level they really do not want to know more about. And it is 
possible that people who suspect that they are the subject matter 
of online hate speech could experience a morbid curiosity to read 
or see the harmful content in its entirety and not just in snippet 
view. This tendency might reflect personality type. But it might 
also conceivably be heightened by experience. If someone has 
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been the victim of hate speech in the past, for instance, ironically 
this trauma could make him or her less able to control, resist, or 
override an instinctive morbid curiosity to click on website links 
which he or she suspects may contain yet more hate speech. 
Bereavement is another traumatic experience that could 
conceivably reduce a person’s ability to control, resist, or override 
an impulse toward morbid curiosity. Of course, hate speech is not 
only found online, and a general impulse toward morbid curiosity 
might also drive a person to listen to hate speakers in person or 
in offline situations. Then again, it is possible that the impulse 
toward morbid curiosity is harder to resist in the case of online 
hate sites precisely because of the relative convenience, 
anonymity, and physical safety provided by the Internet and the 
web, not to mention the shimmer of the computer screen.127 
Whilst I offer no empirical evidence about morbid curiosity and 
online hate speech, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that 
such evidence will begin to emerge as we learn more about 
human usage of the Internet and the web.  
Does this mean, however, that there is a sense in which 
someone is not being held captive by the online hate speech as 
such but by his or her psychological compulsions? Perhaps, but I 
do not think that this makes it any less the case that someone 
could be a captive audience to online hate speech, even if this is 
partly because of morbid curiosity. Nor do I think that this link in 
the causal chain alters the fact that hate speakers can be held 
accountable both for the speech and for the captivity. By analogy 
to the eggshell skull rule in tort law, maybe hate speakers must 
take their audiences as they find them—neuroses and all. 
B. Unreasonable Burdens 
It is one thing to highlight the practical difficulties of 
avoiding online hate speech; it is quite another thing to show 
that the audience is for all intents and purposes held captive by 
those difficulties. After all, people always have the last resort of 
simply deactivating their Facebook or Twitter accounts or 
stepping away from the Internet and the web indefinitely. 
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Consequently, some people might be tempted to say that an 
audience is unwilling only if it is unable to avoid or escape the 
speech, and that Internet and web users are never unable to 
avoid or escape online hate speech because they can always 
choose to live offline. 
On closer inspection, however, this conceptualization of the 
captive audience doctrine is too restrictive. It implies a type of 
physical imprisonment. Instead, the captive audience doctrine is 
best understood as the claim that an audience cannot be 
reasonably expected to avoid or escape exposure because of the 
significant interests that would be harmed, sacrificed, or forfeited 
if it did. The operative test of captivity is whether an ordinary 
person can take practical steps to avoid or escape receiving the 
speech in question whilst at the same time not incurring an 
unreasonable burden, that is, a burden they ought not to have to 
incur. Only if someone can take practical steps to avoid online 
hate speech without bearing an unreasonable burden—without 
suffering harm to significant interests—can it be said that he or 
she is not a captive audience.128 
Take Case 3: Trolling. If friends and family of the deceased 
interracial couple, including people who might themselves be in 
interracial relationships, want to access a full repository of 
pictures, videos, and messages about the deceased couple, and to 
partake in communal processes and rituals of grieving, 
remembrance, and memorialization, and if they lack reasonable 
alternatives to accessing this content and these activities either 
on other websites which are not subject to trolling or in offline 
spaces which are not subject to similar intrusions, then they have 
no option but to visit the website in question. Insofar as they lack 
reasonable alternatives to accessing this content and these 
activities, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to forego 
this content given their equal right to enjoy a normal opportunity 
range in life, including grieving and memorializing, then surely 
this makes them a captive audience. 
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More generally, it is not hard to think of unreasonable 
burdens associated with a general abstinence from the Internet 
and the web. For one thing, people are increasingly using the 
Internet and the web as the central loci of their economic 
activities. I have in mind people who use the web to truck, barter, 
and exchange. But, more generally, most people nowadays use 
the Internet and the web to perform at least some of the essential 
duties associated with their jobs or professions. I am not 
necessarily speaking here of people whose profession is 
intimately connected with their being online and encouraging 
online comments. Perhaps it would stretch the idea of a captive 
audience too far to say that a public blogger, for instance, is a 
captive audience to the comments section on her own blog. 
Rather, I mean people who find themselves having to use the 
Internet and the web simply to do their jobs, just as they might 
find themselves having to travel on public transport simply in 
order to get to their place of work. Consider the judge in Case 6: 
Cyberharassment. The point is that “[i]n today’s interconnected 
world [avoidance] is not a viable option, as people who are forced 
offline forgo important personal and professional 
opportunities.”129 
Several scholars of the existing captive audience doctrine 
have already observed that sometimes avoiding unwelcome 
speech may involve sacrificing economic interests.130 Indeed, 
courts in the United States have frequently accepted that 
employees can be captive audiences in virtue of (a) the practical 
necessities of earning a living in order to make ends meet, (b) the 
reality that employees are required by their contracts and/or 
directed by their employers to be at work, within the confines of 
certain spaces, at certain times, and so forth, and (c) the 
uncertainties, stresses, and financial costs associated with 
seeking alternative forms of employment if one quits one’s job in 
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order to avoid or escape unwelcome speech.131 Courts have also 
held that employees using public transit vehicles in order to 
travel to work can be captive audiences because (d) the nature of 
living and moving in built-up areas means public transport is the 
only viable option.132 
Of course, not every free speech scholar agrees on these 
issues. According to Eugene Volokh, for instance, the argument 
that employees can be a captive audience is flawed because if it is 
true, it proves too much.133 Put simply: 
[I]f captivity consists of an inability to avoid offensive speech, 
in today’s society we are all “captive” to profanity. We may 
walk away from someone who is using it, but we cannot avoid 
it altogether—we hear it wherever we go. This is, regrettably, 
also true of bigoted abuse. In many places, blacks will be called 
names wherever they go; obese or disfigured people may be 
insulted wherever they go. Even in public, they may be able to 
avoid an individual insulter (though not without being insulted 
first), but they cannot avoid the insults altogether.134 
But I would argue that we are only drawn to the implausible 
conclusion that all audiences are captive audiences by 
oversimplifying the concept of captivity. Captivity is not a matter 
of being unable to avoid unwelcome speech altogether. Rather, it 
is a matter of being unable to both avoid unwelcome speech and 
avoid unreasonable burdens whilst doing so. 
Returning to Case 6: Cyberharassment, it may be perfectly 
true to say that as a woman the judge risks being targeted by 
misogynistic speech in various contexts, but the question is 
whether or not it would be reasonable to expect her to avoid those 
contexts. In terms of her professional duties, the question is 
whether it would be reasonable to expect a woman who suffers 
cyberharassment whilst working as a judge to quit her job, given 
(e) the difficulty of finding an alternative line of work that would 
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provide an equivalent sense of professional fulfillment or 
achievement of life ambitions, (f) the problem of finding an 
alternative line of work in which other forms of discriminatory 
harassment will not re-emerge, (g) the lack of equal opportunities 
faced by all women in accessing well-paid professional 
employment, and (h) the risks for women in terms of domestic 
violence and other forms of oppression of being financially 
dependent on male breadwinners during periods of job-seeking. 
Of course, the court authorities could, in the light of the problem 
of misogynistic cyberharassment, opt to refrain from posting 
online any legal judgments made by female judges. Then again, it 
might be unreasonable to expect authorities to take this step, 
given (i) the unwanted symbolism of publishing only the 
judgments of male judges. Of course, they could refrain from 
posting any judgments period. But then this might be 
unreasonable given (j) the negative effect on public confidence in 
the justice system, and (k) the detriment to the educative 
function of the law. 
More generally, other unreasonable burdens associated with 
logging off in the Information Age might include: diminished 
access to information about important public services, 
community events, news, and current affairs; loss of the ability to 
contribute to the formation of public opinion not simply about 
current affairs but also in relation to popular culture in general 
(public opinion which may undergird formal processes of 
democratic decision-making); loss of access to friendship and 
social life; loss of access to communal games or play; loss of 
access to potential life partners, such as through social 
networking websites or online dating apps; loss of access to 
processes of grieving, remembrance, and memorialization of 
deceased friends and loved ones; and so on. The suggestion here 
is not that people who log off have no other means of accessing 
these opportunities. What I am describing is not akin to the sense 
in which welfare recipients waiting in line are a captive audience 
to unwelcome speech because they “have no choice but to come to 
the Local Office for the basic necessities of life.”135 Rather, my 
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suggestion is that if a great many people are predominantly 
doing these things online rather than offline, and if a vast 
majority of people are at least sometimes doings things online 
rather than offline, then persons who live entirely offline will not 
merely be the odd ones out but may be significantly 
disadvantaged. 
Consider once again Case 3: Trolling. Facebook alone 
contains vast numbers of pages dedicated to processes of 
grieving, remembrance, and memorializing. Given the demands 
of work and the problems of geographical distance, not all family 
members, friends, and colleagues of the deceased may have an 
opportunity to attend a formal ceremony. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, a good deal of the memorializing which takes place 
online is about expressions of feelings and the sending of 
condolences that could not be expressed in person on the day of 
the funeral. Of course, it might be argued that strictly speaking 
nobody is compelled to look at, much less contribute to, these 
websites. But that observation is not merely callous, but ignores 
the possibility that partaking in processes of grieving, 
remembrance, and memorialization may be partly constitutive of 
a flourishing human life. In theory, users could avoid the hate 
speech ex ante by installing filtering technologies that would 
block them from accessing websites that have fallen pray to 
trolling. But this would harm a significant interest in partaking 
in the aforementioned processes. If they do not install filters, 
then even once they know that the hate speech is present on the 
sites, they cannot take steps to avoid it ex post without again 
sacrificing significant interests. In short, trolling forces some 
people to make a tragic choice that other people do not have to 
make.136 
What I am suggesting, in other words, is that using the 
Internet and the web can be compelled by the facts of life in the 
Information Age.137 I have also been assuming that in extreme 
cases averting your eyes in the Information Age may involve 
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deactivating, logging out, and switching off. But are there degrees 
of averting your eyes that are worth considering here? What if 
people find themselves only having to avoid some features and 
parts of the Internet and the web where there are plenty of other 
features and parts to choose from?138 In United States v. Sayer,139 
the District Court (D. Me.) judge rejected the idea that victims of 
cyberstalking can be reasonably expected “not to open mail or [to] 
ignore electronic communications such as email, Facebook 
postings, tweets, and text messages” because “[t]he First 
Amendment does not give stalkers a license to place special 
conditions on how their victims use modern forms of 
communication as the price of avoiding hateful attention.”140 The 
Court’s decision was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals.141 When it comes to hate speech on the Internet and the 
web, however, might it be reasonable to expect people to abstain 
from using at least some features and parts of the Internet and 
the web in order to avoid hate speech? Provided that users’ 
options are not severely limited, maybe the interest in autonomy 
in using the Internet and the web need not be significantly 
damaged by some degree of abstinence (some people might 
think). 
What is likely to matter, it seems to me, is whether or not 
there is a decent range of options available to Internet and web 
users. And this must surely have to do with quality and not 
merely quantity. Most people use email accounts for work and 
personal usage. In order to avoid receiving messages containing 
hate speech would users need to steer clear of only some email 
account providers or all? Many people use social networking 
websites and Internet messaging services. Would it be reasonable 
to expect these users to stay away from whichever websites and 
services offered limited de facto protection against hate speech, 
even if they are the most widely used websites and services, in 
favor of specialist websites and services providing much better 
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protection (assuming they existed)? Virtually everyone uses 
Internet browsers and web search engines of one form or another. 
Could we reasonably expect certain groups of people to pass up 
on any web search engines that did not aggressively filter out 
websites containing hate speech? Large numbers of people use 
video-sharing websites. Might potential victims of hate speech be 
reasonably expected to choose their preferred video-sharing 
websites based on the relative amounts of hateful content to be 
found (assuming people could find reliable data on this)? More 
generally, if it turns out that in order to avoid hate speech 
certain groups of people will need to abstain from using the most 
widely used email account providers, social networking websites, 
Internet messaging services, web search engines, and video-
sharing websites, would this leave people with decent access to 
the Internet and the web? 
How could this decent access be defined? One possibility is to 
ask whether or not people enjoy a normal opportunity range on 
the Internet and the web, as defined by the array of online 
activities that ordinary people are likely to want and need to 
partake in given reasonable life plans or reasonable conceptions 
of a fulfilling life. This might include: maintaining and creating 
friendships; pursuing a career; accessing information on current 
affairs; consuming and contributing to popular culture; play; 
participation in civic and political engagement and activism. If 
avoiding hate speech means abstinence from the most widely 
used websites and services, and if this abstinence in turn means 
not being able to enjoy a normal opportunity range of online 
activities, then the degree of avoidance expected would be 
unreasonable. 
Take Case 5: Copycat Parodies. If checking one’s reputation 
as a model (professional opportunities), confirming that one is a 
member of society in good standing (dignitary opportunities), and 
contributing to the discussion of issues surrounding transgender 
identity (public discourse opportunities), are components of a 
normal opportunity range on the Internet and the web, then this 
case does involve a captive audience, other things remaining 
equal. If these activities are not components of a normal 
opportunity range on the Internet and the web, then this case 
does not involve a captive audience, other things remaining 
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equal. 
To come at the issue of partial avoidance from another angle, 
would it be reasonable to expect people to continue to avail 
themselves of the most widely used websites and services, but at 
the same time adapt the ways they use them? Online hate 
speakers often pray on people who opt to reveal aspects of their 
identities or on people whose identities are revealed without 
their consent or somehow assumed or inferred. Consequently, 
would it be reasonable to expect potential victims of hate speech 
to use social networking websites and Internet messaging 
services, say, but not to reveal or to actively disguise aspects of 
their offline identities such as their race, ethnicity, nationality, 
citizenship, origin of birth, war record, religion, sexual 
orientation, gender or transgender identity, disability, age, or 
physical appearance? 
Now it is certainly true that one of the supposed advantages 
of the Internet and the web as a medium for sending and 
receiving information and as a virtual public square is that 
people are not compelled to reveal aspects of their offline 
identities unless they wish to do so. Their beliefs, ideas, and 
attitudes can be presented to other users in anonymous ways if 
they so desire.142 But at this juncture, we are talking about 
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people effectively being distressed, scared, intimidated, or cowed 
by online hate speech into a kind of forced anonymity. Anonymity 
may be a bad thing, not merely because it is enforced, but also 
because of the cost in free speech it may impose. To be forced into 
using websites and services in anonymous ways might inhibit 
users’ speaking their minds authentically, forming deep 
relationships, and sending and/or receiving genuinely personal 
messages. In other words, it might limit what they can get out of 
online experiences and interpersonal interactions in terms of self-
realization, information gathering, contributing to public 
discourse, and so on. 
Thus, the threat that one might become the victim of 
cyberhate may foreclose a range of ways of speaking and 
expressing oneself, as well as certain topics for discussion, and 
even particular spaces or places on the Internet and the web, for 
fear of giving away telltale signs of one’s identity and opening 
oneself up to a deluge of cyberhate as a consequence. But can we 
reasonably expect members of groups or classes of persons who 
are likely to be subjected to cyberhate to have less meaningful 
friendships or other relationships online, gain a poorer 
understanding of who they are through self-expression online, 
pursue fewer economic opportunities online, contribute in 
diminished ways to the formation of popular culture and public 
opinion online, and participate to a lesser extent in various forms 
of civic, political, and religious life online, as the price they must 
pay to avoid hate speech? Surely not. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Finally, what, if anything, follows from showing that online 
hate speech can create or exploit captive audiences? One possible 
source of significance concerns the free speech doctrine of content 
and viewpoint neutrality. For several decades, this doctrine has 
stood as a constitutional barrier to hate speech law in the United 
States. Most notably, in R.A.V. the U.S. Supreme Court struck 
down the City of St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance inter 
alia because it involved content and viewpoint discrimination. 
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The Court accepted the City of St. Paul’s argument that it had 
intended the ordinance as prohibiting fighting words (a category 
of proscribable speech), but the Court extended the requirements 
of neutrality even to laws which seek to draw distinctions 
between subcategories of proscribable speech. The majority ruled 
that the ordinance violated content neutrality in virtue of the fact 
that on its face it proscribed only fighting words with certain 
sorts of content (i.e., messages relating to race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender) and violated viewpoint neutrality because as-
applied it prohibited only particular kinds of viewpoint (i.e., 
people holding or advocating a particular position on issues of 
race, color, creed, religion, or gender).143 Much has been written 
about R.A.V. and about whether or not content- and viewpoint-
based regulations are always impermissible under the First 
Amendment and, furthermore, whether hate speech regulations 
might be permissible exceptions under a nuanced reading of the 
content and viewpoint neutrality doctrine, in virtue of their 
sometimes fitting into the broader class of harm-preventing 
speech regulations or even “militant” democracy-protecting 
speech regulations.144 Nevertheless, what interests me here is the 
fact that in R.A.V. the Court chose not to consider whether or not 
this case involved a captive audience. But if it could be shown 
that certain instances of hate speech, including but not limited to 
cross burning, involve captive audiences, then surely there is at 
least potential for the captive audience doctrine to defeat, or fall 
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within recognized exceptions to, countervailing free speech 
doctrines, including the content and viewpoint neutrality 
doctrine, in the relevant cases. And if that is possible, then 
perhaps the same could be said of regulations curbing online hate 
speech involving captive audiences. 
Clearly, these are contested issues. In the context of 
discussing other forms of speech (besides hate speech), Strauss 
has suggested that “the captive audience doctrine allows courts 
to ignore the traditional requirement of content neutrality; courts 
inevitably engage in viewpoint- or content-based discrimination 
when applying the doctrine.”145 Following on from this, Major has 
tentatively proposed that Strauss’ thesis might also hold for 
cases of cyberstalking146 including Cassidy, albeit, as I have 
already pointed out, the court in that case did not explicitly 
address itself to the captive audience doctrine. Yet there is no 
doubting that some scholars of American free speech doctrine 
would insist that cases involving content- and viewpoint-based 
hate speech regulations are a different matter.147 Indeed, when it 
comes to discriminatory harassment in the workplace, several 
scholars have argued that the captive audience dimension does 
not allow courts in the United States to ignore the traditional 
requirements of content and viewpoint neutrality.148 Therefore, 
what I am proposing in terms of changes to current free speech 
doctrine are likely, at best, to seem plausible to only a minority of 
free speech scholars within the wider debate on, and 
controversies surrounding, hate speech regulations in the United 
States. 
A second possible source of significance has to do with 
principles of net neutrality, namely, that Internet providers may 
not pick and choose what content to make available to their 
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users—principles highly relevant to the regulation of the 
Internet and the web. In 2015, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) published new rules on the open Internet,149 
including the following net neutrality rule: “A person engaged in 
the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as 
such person is so engaged, shall not block lawful content, 
applications, services, or non-harmful devices, subject to 
reasonable network management.”150 In December 2017, 
however, the FCC voted to repeal this “heavy-handed 
framework”.151 The purpose of my article is not to try to second-
guess what the courts in the United States are likely to decide in 
cases challenging the FCC’s decision to repeal net neutrality 
rules, or what the FCC and the courts will henceforth decide in 
cases which implicate both net neutrality rules and the captive 
audience doctrine—or even if they would in fact acknowledge the 
existence of such cases. Instead, I want to make it clear (based on 
the foregoing arguments) what I believe they should say. 
For one thing, they should say that the principle of net 
neutrality is not superior to the captive audience doctrine and 
vice versa.152 No doubt, some people believe that regulating 
online hate speech can be justified in spite of the principle of net 
neutrality, and perhaps also that the question of whether or not 
online hate speech involves captive audiences makes no 
difference one way or the other to this justification.153 
Conversely, others believe that regulating online hate speech 
cannot be justified precisely because of the values that underpin 
the principle of net neutrality, and that the question of whether 
or not online hate speech involves captive audiences also makes 
no difference to this failure of justification. My own view is that 
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existing arguments for regulating online hate speech can be 
made stronger by appealing to the captive audience doctrine. I do 
not mean to say, however, that this appeal is a necessary or a 
sufficient condition for making a decisive argument for the 
regulation of online hate speech. Instead, I simply say that 
appealing to the captive audience doctrine can make a positive 
difference to the justificatory score. 
Furthermore, I believe that Internet regulators and courts—
and Internet companies themselves for that matter—should 
accept that persons can be held as captive audiences in public 
forums on the Internet and the web, as well as in nonpublic 
forums and in hybrid public/non-public forums on the Internet 
and the web. Once again, in making this argument I do not seek 
to deny the importance of the Internet and the web qua tools of 
mass communication and servants of free speech values, such as 
the pursuit of truth, self-realization, and the formation of 
democratic public opinion. Instead, I mainly want to challenge 
the simplistic assumption that because communicative content 
received through or viewed on the Internet and the web never 
appears on users’ screens without users taking a series of 
affirmative steps, there can be no captive audiences on the 
Internet and on the web.154 
Finally, in this contribution I have only made suggestions as 
to how American free speech doctrine should be changed so as to 
provide constitutional breathing space, so to speak, for 
restrictions on online hate speech in circumstances that this type 
of speech creates or exploits captive audiences. I have not sought 
to propose or defend any particular hate speech laws or 
regulations that might be applicable to online hate speech 
involving captive audiences, nor any precise scheme of liability 
for online hate speakers in such cases, be it through Internet 
regulation, criminal law, civil law, or human rights law.155 Nor 
have I tried to defend any specific regimes of Internet 
regulation—whether that is the statutory regulation of Internet 
companies or a scheme of self-regulation by Internet companies—
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that could be used to tackle instances of online hate speech 
involving captive audiences. These issues implicate much larger 
and vitally important debates about liability, responsibility, and 
Internet regulation addressed elsewhere in the literature.156 
Moreover, in highlighting the applicability of the captive 
audience doctrine, I do not mean to exclude other avenues for 
redress among victims of online hate speech. Various writers 
have argued, for instance, that the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress can be, and should be, used as a remedy for 
victims of hate speech,157 and some have extending these 
proposals so as to include online hate speech.158 Another writer 
has examined the prospects for using the tort of invasion privacy 
(false light) in cases involving hate speech, including online hate 
speech.159 I do not seek to pretend that the captive audience 
doctrine would be strictly necessary for these other extension 
projects.160 Rather I have merely tried to motivate the 
applicability of the captive audience doctrine to cases of online 
hate speech, whilst noting the varied nature not merely of 
cyberhate itself but also of spaces and places on the Internet and 
the web.161 
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